Abstract. A broadcast encryption system allows a center to communicate securely over a broadcast channel with selected sets of users. Each time the set of privileged users changes, the center enacts a protocol to establish a new broadcast key that only the privileged users can obtain, and subsequent transmissions by the center are encrypted using the new broadcast key. We study the inherent trade-o between the number of establishment keys held by each user and the number of transmissions needed to establish a new broadcast key. For every given upper bound on the number of establishment keys held by each user, we prove a lower bound on the number of transmissions needed to establish a new broadcast key. We show that these bounds are essentially tight, by describing broadcast encryption systems that come close to these bounds.
Introduction
Broadcast encryption addresses the problem of the allocation of secret keys to users in order to enable a center to broadcast to selected subsets of users with security. This is an important problem in the larger area of network security, and it has increased in prominence with the growth of the pay-television industry.
Our model is a formalization of that of Fiat and Naor 7] . Each user initially holds a personalized subset of all possible establishment keys. Each time the center needs to establish a new broadcast key it enacts an establishment protocol. This protocol consists of a sequence of transmissions, each transmission is encrypted using a di erent establishment key. A transmission can only be decrypted by users who have the corresponding establishment key in their personalized set. The broadcast encryption system should be designed so that only privileged users are able to compute the new broadcast key when the protocol ends. Subsequent transmissions by the center are encrypted using the newly established broadcast key.
As an example, consider the simple broadcast encryption system in which each user has a unique establishment key. To establish a new broadcast key, select a random key B and send one transmission for each of the privileged users, encrypting B with the establishment key of the user. This protocol only requires a small amount of storage as each user holds just one establishment key. However, it requires a large amount of communication because the number of transmissions is equal to the number of users in the privileged set. At the opposite end of the spectrum, consider the broadcast encryption system that assigns to each set of users a unique establishment key, and each user holds the keys for all sets in which it is a member. To establish a new broadcast key, select a random key B and send one transmission encrypting B using the establishment key associated with the set of privileged users. This system only requires one transmission (low communication). However, it requires each user to hold as many establishment keys as there are privileged sets in which it is a member (high storage). These two examples suggest there is a trade-o between the number of transmissions needed to establish a new broadcast key and the number of establishment keys held by each user. This trade-o is the subject of this paper.
We focus on the case in which the privileged sets consist of all sets of users of a certain xed size. It is not unreasonable to focus on such a collection of privileged sets, since in practice the number of users requesting any given broadcast can be bounded accurately a priori. For example, the set of excluded users may just be those who have neglected to pay their pay-television bill that month. Over time, the number of delinquent users is likely to be relatively stable (and small).
We prove that for a given upper bound on the number of establishment keys held by each user there is an inherent lower bound on the number of transmissions needed to establish a new broadcast key. For di erent types of protocols, we then describe constructions that come within a constant factor of these bounds, thereby demonstrating that our trade-o bounds are close to optimal. We note that our bounds do not take into account how much information is sent with each transmission. Most of our constructions do not send much information (i.e. just a single key) with each transmission.
The organization of this paper is as follows: Section 2 describes previous work in this area, Section 3 contains all the de nitions and notation, Section 4 describes the model from a set theoretic perspective and the mathematical tools that we use, Section 5 contains lower bounds on the number of keys per user in broadcast encryption systems (our main results), Section 6 describes constructions that are close to these bounds, and Section 7 is a brief conclusion.
Previous Work
Previously, bounds in the general broadcast encryption model have been given for various parameters. Fiat and Naor 7] introduce broadcast encryption and describe several constructions. They focus on a feature of broadcast encryption systems called resiliency. A broadcast encryption system is k-resilient if a center is able to broadcast to any set of privileged users with the assurance that no disjoint coalition of k excluded users can receive the broadcast even by sharing their establishment keys . They construct both unconditionally secure and computationally secure systems of various resiliencies. Our lower bounds apply even to 1-resilient protocols, and thus our bounds are as strong as possible. In addition, some of the establishment protocols we describe are resilient against arbitrary coalitions of excluded users and come close to the trade-o parameters of our lower bounds. We also describe less resilient establishment protocols that meet our lower bounds.
Blundo and Cresti study unconditionally secure broadcast encryption systems further in 2]. They prove information theoretic lower bounds for a model of unconditionally secure broadcast encryption focusing on zero-message broadcast encryption (no transmissions by the center) and interactive broadcast encryption. Here we present broadcast encryption systems in which the number of keys per user is much smaller than the zero-message schemes in 2] by allowing a positive number of transmissions. These transmissions take the form of one-way (i.e. noninteractive) broadcasts from the center to the users.
In 4] constructions and lower bounds for a model of unconditionally secure broadcast encryption are presented. The authors of 4] are also interested in the communication-storage trade-o . In their model each user is given some secret information and the users use the information to compute common keys via a key predistribution scheme such as in 1] or 3]. The e ciency of the systems in 4] is measured by considering the amount of secret information held by each user as compared to the information content of the broadcast made to establish the broadcast key; and the size of the broadcast as compared to its information content (i.e. it is an information theoretic model). In this paper we assume that the users are actually given the keys (for example, in an integrated circuit (IC) card) rather than the information with which to compute them, and communication is measured in terms of the number of keys needed to establish the broadcast key (the number of transmissions). The e ciency of our systems is measured by comparing the number of keys per user to the number of transmissions. These are both important practical parameters. In an implementation of a broadcast encryption system, a user's keys may be contained in an IC card with only limited memory, and the broadcasting center may want to limit the number of transmissions due to cost-e ciency concerns. Because of the di erences between our measurements of e ciency and those in 4], the optimal systems in 4] are generally not optimal in our model. For example, they present an optimal scheme using resolvable designs, with ? x x 2 transmissions to broadcast to a privileged set of size x, out of a universe of n users, that requires each user to generate ? n?1 x in terms of the number of transmissions. Stinson and Trung 12] continue the analysis of the trade-o studied in 4] by presenting new constructions of key predistribution schemes and broadcast encryption systems. They also prove new lower bounds on information rates of the aforementioned trade-o s.
A survey of broadcast encryption systems (constructed prior to 4]) can be found in 11].
De nitions and Notation
We are largely motivated by the scenario of pay-TV in which there is a set of users who have paid to watch a particular TV station. We call the users who have paid for this service the set of privileged users, and the collection of users who are not in the set, excluded users. We want to allocate establishment keys to users in such a way that the center can establish a new broadcast key with which to encode the TV station for any particular set of privileged users. Any excluded user should be unable to decipher the broadcast key. We'll denote the collection of privileged sets of users by P.
In this paper, we let P be the collection of all subsets of users of size n ? m, where n is the total number of users, and m is the size of an excluded set of users. We show that the number of keys per user can be reasonably small when either m is much smaller than n (m << n=2) or m is very large (m >> n=2). It is likely that one of these scenarios will be the case in practice. For example, to a pay-television station m is the number of users who do not pay their bill in a given month; usually this is a small number. On the other hand, to a payper-view provider m is the (usually large) number of users who do not request to view a particular lm. Let S denote the set of all establishment keys. The set of establishment keys known by user u, is denoted by U S. Let K = jSj be the total number of establishment keys, and let jU j max = max u jUj. For a set of privileged users, P 2 P, the set of establishment keys which the center uses to establish the new broadcast key will be denoted by S P S. The number of transmissions is de ned to be t = max P2P jS P j.
The focus of this paper is the trade-o between the number of transmissions, t, and the maximum number of keys per user, jUj max .
The broadcast key used to encrypt the TV station for the users in P is denoted by B P . To each privileged set P there is an associated establishment protocol. The establishment protocol de nes which subsets of keys in S P are su cient to recover B P . Two natural establishment protocols are what we call the OR and AND protocols. If the center is broadcasting to P with an OR protocol then a user needs at least one key in S P to be able to decrypt B P .
With an AND protocol a user needs all the keys in S P to be able to decrypt B P . We will discuss speci c examples of broadcast encryption systems that use these protocols later.
We'll often refer to establishment keys and establishment protocols as, simply, keys and protocols. However, we will always distinguish between (establishment) keys and broadcast keys.
Suppose the center wants to establish a broadcast key B P to broadcast to the users in the privileged set P. The center rst generates random binary strings B P and T P . For each key k 2 S P the center then generates a string c P k (B P ; T P ) based on the establishment protocol associated with P. The string c P k (B P ; T P ) is then encrypted, in a computationally secure way, so that key k is necessary to decrypt it. Each user u is able to recover fc P k (B P ; T P ) : k 2 Ug. We assume that a user w for which k 6 2 W gains no information about c P k (B P ; T P ) from the encryption of c P k (B P ; T P ). For each privileged set P there is a function d P which on input all the information user u 2 P is able to decrypt, outputs B P .
The following conditions must be met by any establishment protocol:
I. Any privileged user is able to recover enough information to construct the broadcast key, i.e. 8u 2 P, d P (fc P k (B P ; T P ) : k 2 Ug) = B P .
II. For any possible decoding algorithm d 0 P , and for any possible output string of the decoding algorithm, each string 2 f0; 1g jBPj is equally likely to be the broadcast key, i.e. 8w 6 2 P, 8d 0 P , 8 2 f0; 1g jBPj , 8 2 f0; 1g jBPj , Pr B P = jd 0 P (fc P k (B P ; T P ) : k 2 Wg) = ] = 1 2 jB P j . Note that an excluded user w may be able to obtain some information if he has some of the keys used to encrypt the transmissions. The broadcast encryption system must be designed so that the broadcast key is uniformly distributed even with this information.
For an OR protocol the center sets T P = ;, the empty string. Since any key in S P must be su cient to decode B P , the center de nes c P k (B P ; ;) to be B P for every k 2 S P . In other words, the center replicates B P , jS P j number of times. Then d P (fc P k (B P ; ;) : k 2 Ug) = c P k (B P ; ;) = B P for all k 2 S P . It is important to note here that OR protocols are secure against arbitrary coalitions of excluded users since any excluded user has none of the keys in S P and it is necessary to have at least one of the keys in S P to decode B P .
The OR Protocol { Any one key in S P is su cient to recover the broadcast key, B P . { Secure against arbitrary coalitions of excluded users, since any excluded user has none of the keys in S P .
{ Implementation:
1. Set T P = ;. 2. For all k 2 S P , c P k (B P ; T P ) = B P . 3. For all u 2 P, 9k 2 S P \ U such that d P (c P k (B P ; T P )) = B P .
For an AND protocol with S P = fk 1 ; : : :; k r g, r t, the center generates r ? 1 random strings T k1 P ; : : :; T kr?1 P and de nes T kr P to be B P T k1 P : : :
T kr?1 P . The string T P is the concatenation of T k1 P ; : : :; T kr P . For each k i 2 S P , c P ki (B P ; T P ) = T ki P , and for every user u in P, d P (fc P k (B P ; T P ) : k 2 Ug) = r i=1 c P ki (B P ; T P ) = B P . If a user is missing k i 2 S P then the user will be unable to decode c P ki (B P ; T P ) = T ki P , and hence will not be able to decode B P .
The AND Protocol { It is necessary to have all of the keys in S P to recover B P . { Secure against a coalition of one excluded user; two excluded users may be able to recover B P by pooling their keys.
{ Implementation: 1. Let S P = fk 1 ; :::; k r g, r t. For all i < r, T ki P is a randomly chosen string in f0; 1g jBPj , T kr P = B P T k1 P ::: T kr?1 P and T P = T k1 P k T k2 P k ::: k T kr P .
2. For all k i 2 S P , c P ki (B P ; T P ) = T ki P .
3. For all u 2 P, 8 i = 1; :::; r k i 2 U, and d P (fc P ki (B P ; T P ) : i = 1; :::; rg) = r i=1 c P ki (B P ; T P ) = B P .
We can implement other establishment protocols by using these same ideas of replication (as in the OR protocol) and exclusive-or (as in the AND protocol). We will discuss other establishment protocols more in later sections.
Finally, it will be helpful in our later discussion of establishment protocols to have a function associated with each privileged set P that on input a subset of S P returns a value of 1 if the subset is su cient to decode B P , and 0 otherwise. This function is referred to as a characteristic function for the establishment protocol associated with P. This is formalized below. Let U 2 f0; 1g K be the characteristic string of the keys held by user u. Let Ui \ Uj be the characteristic string of the intersection of sets U i and U j . Let D denote the inclusion poset on f0; 1g K (see Section 4.2 for de nition). For every subset P 2 P we have a monotonically increasing function f P : D ! f0; 1g. Let SP 2 f0; 1g K be the characteristic string of S P , then SP has at most t ones.
The following hold:
I. 8P 2 P; 8u 2 P; f P ( U \ SP ) = 1 II. 8P 2 P; 8w 6 2 P; f P ( W \ SP ) = 0
For example, let the number of users be n = 3 and let P be the collection of all subsets of users of size 2. Then with K = 3, t = 2, and OR protocols for each P i i = 1; 2; : : :; 6, the following characteristic functions (monotonically extended) satisfy the above properties: 
Establishment Protocols
In Section 3 we introduce the functions ff P g P ; the characteristic functions of the establishment protocols associated with the privileged sets. From each f P a set theoretic description of each privileged set can be derived. This description suggests a natural construction with OR protocols. Also, this description may be helpful in proving other protocol speci c lower bounds. We rst describe how each f P is equivalent to a certain logical formula involving the boolean operations _ and^, and then we show how to translate this logical formula into a set formula for P.
De nition1. Let be a set containing the symbols k 1 ; : : :; k K that is closed under the boolean operations^and _. A formula is any member of .
To nd a formula that corresponds to a function f P , we simply consider all sets of keys fA i g that su ce to receive the broadcast key (i.e. f P ( Ai ) = 1). An f P function can then be expressed as a formula by taking the disjunction of all formulas of the form^k 2Ai k. To nd an equivalent formula we only consider minimal sets A i that su ce to receive the broadcast key. For example, let S P = fk 1 ; k 2 ; k 3 g and let f P be de ned as follows:
f P (0; 0; 0) = 0; f P (1; 0; 0) = 0; f P (0; 1; 0) = 0; f P (0; 0; 1) = 0; f P (1; 1; 0) = 1; f P (1; 0; 1) = 1; f P (0; 1; 1) = 1; f P (1; 1; 1) = 1. Then we can represent f P by the formula (k 1^k2 )_(k 1^k3 )_(k 2^k3 )_(k 1k 2^k3 ) or equivalently, fP = (k 1^k2 ) _ (k 1^k3 ) _ (k 2^k3 ). We can translate this into a set theoretic formulation by letting i denote the set of users who have key k i .
To implement a protocol given a formula,simply use a separate AND protocol on each of the conjunctive subformulas as described in Section 3. To implement the previous example use three independently generated AND protocols, for the same broadcast key B P , on the conjunctive subformulas.
De nition2. Let S be a collection of sets containing the symbols 1 ; : : :; K that is closed under the operations of intersection, \, and union, . A set formula is any member of S .
We have the following theorem that holds for any set system P. Theorem3. A broadcast encryption system with characteristic functions ff P g P2P and K keys total exists if and only if there are K sets 1 ; : : :; K , each contained in fu 1 ; : : :; u n g, such that 8P 2 P there exists a set fi 1 ; : : :; i rP g f1; :::; Kg, (r P t) and P is equal to a set formula fP with set symbols i1 ; : : :; ir P .
Proof: Assume we have such a broadcast encryption system. Then for all P 2 P there is a boolean function f P and a set S P of at most t keys, that returns one on input a characteristic string U \ S P if u 2 P, and returns zero if u 6 2 P.
To construct a formula that describes f P , rst form the conjunction of the set of key symbols corresponding to a minimal set of keys in S P that su ces to decrypt B P for each privileged user. The formula consists of the disjunction of all the subformulas formed in this way (i.e. one for each privileged user). If we substitute i for k i , \ for^, and for _ then we obtain a set formula for P.
Conversely, allocate to user i key k j if and only if u i 2 j . Translate the set formulas into formulas for monotonic encryption functions by reversing the above substitutions. Then we have a broadcast encryption system for P with at most t transmissions. The system can be implemented as described previously.2 The previous theorem proves broadcast encryption systems can also be dened in a set theoretic manner. This description doesn't capture all aspects of the implementation of the system; for example, the length of the transmissions is not explicitly de ned.
The following Corollary gives a necessary and su cient characterization of OR protocols.
Corollary 4. There is a broadcast encryption system with OR protocols for P, at most t transmissions, and K keys total if and only if there are K subsets = f 1 ; : : :; K g of fu 1 ; : : :; u n g such that for all P 2 P there are 1 i 1 ; : : :; i rP K, r P t, such that P = r j=1 ij .
Given any collection of key establishment protocols we can prove corollaries to Theorem 3, as we did above for a collection of OR protocols. A construction of a broadcast encryption system with OR protocols follows naturally from the set theoretic characterization given here.
Mathematical Tools
In this section we describe a couple of concepts and theorems that we use to establish our main results; lower bounds on the number of keys per user in broadcast encryption systems. The previous section indicates that it's helpful to think of broadcast encryption systems in a set theoretic way, and the mathematics we discuss here is from the area of extremal set theory. The following famous results gives a lower bound on the size of a sun ower in a set system. Lemma 9 Sun ower Lemma, Erd os and Rado. Let t,n be positive integers. Let F be a collection of n sets, each of size at most t. Then F contains a sunower of size at least n 1=t t .
Lower Bounds
In this section we prove lower bounds on the number of keys per user for a variety of protocols. We begin with OR protocols, as these are both simple and very secure. In Section 5.2, we show that the ideas behind the proofs in Section 5.1 can be extended without much di culty to a much larger class of protocols that we call consistent protocols. Consistent protocols are interesting because they are more general, but still easy to implement. In Section 5.3 we prove lower bounds for a broadcast encryption system with an arbitrary collection of protocols. For the case of all OR protocols and consistent protocols, the bounds are the same.
For an arbitrary collection of protocols and small t, we prove a lower bound on jUj max that is on the same order as in the previous two cases.
OR Protocols
In this section all the protocols are OR protocols. We are particularly interested in OR protocols because, as mentioned in Section 3, any OR protocol is resilient against arbitrary coalitions of excluded users. To motivate our lower bounds on the number of keys per user we rst consider the relationship between K the total number of keys, and jPj, the number of privileged sets. To do this, we prove the following simple corollary of the LY M inequality. ). However a larger lower bound can be proven when m is much smaller than n. We show that for arbitrary but xed (with respect to n) values of m and t, the maximum number of keys per user and the average number of keys per user are both ( ? n m 1=t ). To prove these two results we rely on the Sun ower lemma of Erd os and Rado.
Theorem 12. In any broadcast encryption system with OR protocols, jUj max ( n m ) 1=t t ? 1 =m. Proof: From Lemma 9 we know that the set system fS P g P2P contains a sunower, F, of size at least ( n m ) 1=t t . Consider a set S P 2F. The users in P c must, as a group, contain at least one key in each of the other petals of the sun ower; therefore they collectively have at least ( n m ) 1=t t ? 1 keys, and so, some user in the group has at least ( n m ) 1=t t ? 1 =m keys. 2
We can also use Lemma 9 to get a lower bound on the average number of keys per user. For this it su ces to show that the number of sets in fS P g P2P that aren't in a su ciently large sun ower is exponentially small. 
Consistent Establishment Protocols
Just as we've considered broadcast encryption systems with all OR protocols, we might consider broadcast encryption systems in which the protocols are all the same, though not necessarily of the OR type (e.g. all AND protocols). In fact, we can generalize this notion a bit to obtain what we call consistent protocols and show that the results from Section 5.1 hold when the protocols for the privileged sets are consistent. Such a collection of protocols will in general be simpler to implement than an arbitrary collection of protocols, but they will not generally have the high security of the OR protocols. Informally, the protocol for P is consistent with the protocol for P 0 if any subset V S P \ S 0 P su ces to receive B P if and only if it su ces to receive B P 0 . We formalize the de nition of consistent establishment protocols in terms of the characteristic functions below and prove lower bounds in this case.
De nition14. The functions ff P g P2P are consistent i for all P 1 6 = P 2 , and for all characteristic strings V where V S P1 \ S P2 , f P1 ( V ) = f P2 ( V ). Theorem15. In any broadcast encryption system with consistent protocols, jUj max ( n m ) 1=t 2tm .
Proof: From Lemma 9 we know that the set system fS P g P2P contains a sunower, F, of size at least j( n m )j 1=t t . Consider S P1 2 F. For every S Pi 2 F di erent from S P1 , there is some user u 2 P c 1 \ P i . Since the functions ff P g P are consistent user u must have a key in S Pi that's not in S P1 \ S Pi , so user u has a key in the petal S Pi ? C F . By this argument, at least one of the m users in P c Proof: Apply the same modi cation to Theorem 13 as was applied to Theorem 12 to prove Theorem 15. 2
General Establishment Protocols
In this section we consider broadcast encryption systems in which the protocols corresponding to the individual privileged sets are not necessarily related. When t is small, we can extend the ideas of the previous section to get a lower bound on the maximum number of keys per user. Recall that, practically, a small value for t is a desirable feature of a broadcast encryption system, as it usually indicates that a broadcast key can be established quickly and inexpensively. (ii) If jL i j > 2m then if S P is a petal that splits L i , P must include at least 1=2 of the users in L i . Therefore the average number of keys amongst the users in L i is at least 1 2 jPj 1=t t2 t ? 2 t(m?1) keys. 2 
Constructions
In this section we demonstrate that the lower bounds from Section 5 are essentially tight by describing broadcast encryption systems that come close to the bounds. The rst construction is for the most secure case of OR protocols, the second construction uses all AND protocols and the third construction uses consistent protocols. Also, in the rst two constructions a relatively small amount of information is sent with each transmission. The last construction may have large transmission sizes. , and so the above construction is close to optimal. 2 Although the above theorem shows that we cannot always reach our lower bound on the number of keys per user with OR protocols, we can construct optimal broadcast encryption systems for arbitrary t and m with other protocols. Give k A to every user except those in A. Given any set of m excluded users, P c , choose A 1 ; : : :; A t P c such that t i=1 A i = P c and jA i j = dm=te. Let k i be the key that all the users in A i are missing. We'll decide to transmit information using these keys in such a way that a user must have all of k 1 ; : : :; k t to receive the broadcast key. This system uses AND protocols with S M = fk 1 ; : : :; k t g.
In the notation of the previous section, = f 1 ; : : :; K g is the collection of all subsets of fu 1 ; : : :; u n g of size n ? d m t e.
Two broadcast encryption systems that use the same set of keys are complementary if the set of keys that user i holds in one system is the complement of the set of keys the same user holds in the other system. Therefore, if we can use OR protocols to broadcast to any set of n ? m users in a BES, then we can use AND protocols to broadcast to any set of m users in the complementary BES.
When m n=2 and m t we can use the method of construction II to nd a broadcast encryption system for P c = fP c : P 2 Pg (the complementary BES). This system uses OR protocols for P and the number of keys per user is close to our lower bounds.
We can increase the resiliency of this broadcast encryption system by increasing the size of the subsets A of the rst paragraph. This will increase the likelihood that a subset of colluding users are all missing a particular key. It will also increase the number of keys per user.
III. A broadcast encryption system for t > m: Let ? K d t m e be the least integer greater than or equal to n, so the number of keys per user is on the order of the proven lower bounds.
Let U i be the set of keys held by user u i . Choose n subsets U 1 ; : : :; U n of the key set f1; : : :; Kg each of size K ? d t m e. Let P be a set of privileged users. We'll transmit to user u r 2 P with the keys in U r . This implies that U r = U s , a contradiction, so the system is secure.
Conclusion
In this paper, we've studied the trade-o between the number of keys per user and the number of transmissions in broadcast encryption systems. These are important parameters to study because they measure quantities that e ect the cost-e ectiveness and speed of a broadcast encryption system. The number of keys per user has a positive correlation with the amount of memory per user, and the number of transmissions e ects the speed of the system. These are the rst proven lower bounds for these parameters, as far as we know. Some simple constructions demonstrate that these bounds are essentially tight.
An additional consideration, not fully addressed here, is that of the size of each transmission (or bandwidth). Our rst two constructions are e cient in this respect, as they each require only that a binary string of the same size as the broadcast key be sent with each transmission. The third construction, however, requires that O(n) binary strings of the same size as the broadcast key be sent with each transmission.
